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Case No. 20110056-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff / Appellee,
vs.

MICHAEL C MARTIN,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a conviction for criminal mischief, a class A
misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-402(1). This Court has
jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2009).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in determining that Defendant
violated the condition of his plea agreement that required repair work to be
done by a licensed third party?
Standard of Review. To prevail, defendant "'must show that the evidence
of a probation violation, viewed in a light most favorable to the trial court's
findings, is so deficient that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking
defendant's probation.'" State v. Peterson, 869 P.2d 989, 991 (Utah App. 1994)
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(quoting State v. Jameson, 800 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1990)).] Whether defendant
committed a violation is a factual finding, overturned on appeal only if it is
clearly erroneous. State v. Martinez, 811 P.2d 205, 208-09 (Utah App. 1991).
STATUTES
The following statutes are attached at Addendum A:
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-144,-2,-4 (West 2004).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with two counts of criminal mischief, a second
degree felony (count 1) and a third degree felony (count 2). R3-5. On September
29, 2005, the State dismissed the second degree felony, in exchange for
Defendant's no-contest plea in abeyance to the third degree felony. R3-5,51-58,
59,188. The court also imposed conditions of probation. R55. Ten months later,
on July 28,2006, the State filed an affidavit in support of an order to show cause,
alleging that Defendant had violated the conditions of his probation. Rl08-09.
After taking evidence, the district court revoked the plea in abeyance. R124-25.

Procedures governing probation do not necessarily apply directly to
pleas in abeyance. See State v. Turnbow, 2001 UT App 59, <{f 10-17,21 P.3d 249.
However, the termination of a plea in abeyance agreement, like the revocation of
probation, is plainly a matter of a trial court's discretion. See UTAH CODE ANN. §
77-2a-4(l) (West 2004) ("If, following an evidentiary hearing, the court finds that
the defendant has failed to substantially comply with any term or condition of
the plea in abevance aereement, it mav terminate the aereement... .").
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

On March 9, 2007, at a hearing scheduled for sentencing, the court sua
sponte announced its intent to reduce the second degree felony that should have
been dismissed pursuant to the plea bargain (count 1) to a third degree felony
and to reduce the third degree felony (count 2) to which Defendant had entered
his plea to a class A misdemeanor. R190:5. On April 20, 2007, the court
sentenced defendant, imposing a suspended prison term of zero-to-five years on
the third degree felony and a suspended jail term of 365 days on the class A
misdemeanor. R131-33 at addendum A; R192:17-18. The court also ordered
Defendant to serve 365 days in jail for the third degree felony. R132. The court
declined to order restitution. R192:18. On May 8, 2007, the court held an
additional hearing and issued a memorandum decision to correct its earlier
ruling, vacate the sentence, and set a time for re-sentencing. R136-40. On May
21, 2007, defendant filed a notice of appeal from the court's May 8th order.
R141. This Court dismissed Defendant's appeal for lack of jurisdiction because
"there was no sentence and, therefore, no final order to appeal from/' State v.
Martin, 2009 UT App 43, Tf 11, 204 P.3d 875 ("Martin I").
On August 28, 2009, the trial court sentenced Defendant to one year of
probation, ordered him to pay "full & complete restitution," and ordered him to
complete community service. R323-24; R444:9-10. On April 9, 2010, the trial
court set restitution at $8,650. R344. A final restitution order was entered on
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June 4,2010. R357. On June 24,2010, Defendant filed a pro se notice of appeal.
R363.
This Court denied Defendant's appeal as untimely because it had not been
filed within 30 days of his August 28,2009, sentencing. State v. Martin, 2010 UT
App 238U, *1, 2010 WL 3361391 ("Martin IF); R373-74. This Court also noted
that Defendant did not address any restitution or other post-conviction issues,
but instead "attempted] to reach back to challenge his conviction/' Id. at n.l.
Defendant subsequently filed a pro se motion under Rule 4(f), Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, to reinstate his right to appeal, and a motion for postconviction relief. R375-79. Counsel was appointed and requested a hearing on
Defendant's rule 4(f) motion. R400. Defendant testified that after he had been
sentenced, his attorney advised him that he had to wait until after the restitution
hearing to appeal. R448:15, On December 17,2010, the trial court restarted the
time for Defendant to appeal under rule 4(f). R443; R448:23,25-26. Defendant
filed a timely notice of appeal on January 7, 2011. R449.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case is rooted in a dispute that arose in 2004 between neighbors in
Salt Lake City's Avenues district. Defendant stated in his 2005 plea agreement:
"I removed a fence that I believed was impeding a right of way that I believed I
had to remove. I also removed a tree that I believed to be impeding the right of
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way." R52. The tree defendant cut down was a mature elm, with a trunk
diameter of approximately 28 inches and a height of 45 to 50 feet, valued at
$4000. R69, 341, R197:40; 445:21-23; R446:70; State's Ex. 10. Defendant also
removed a chain link fence on the north side of his neighbor's property and
twelve high quality grape vines — California grapes — that had covered the fence.
R197:5-6; 445:20,23-25.
On September 29,2005, Defendant entered a no-contest plea in abeyance
to one count of criminal mischief, a third degree felony. The State agreed to
dismiss the other count of criminal mischief, a second degree felony. R51-58.
The court explained to Defendant that if he did not satisfy the conditions of the
plea agreement, "the Court will enter your guilty plea and you will be subject to
punishment." R188:7. An express condition of the written plea agreement was
"that the defendant replace the chain link fence and replant an elm tree that
defendant removed, and replace the shrubs destroyed and to have the work
done by a licensed third party." R55.
The minute entry for the plea hearing also reflects the conditions imposed:
"Deft to replace the chain link fence[;] Deft to replant an elm tree[;] Deft to
replace the shrubs that were destroyed [;] All work to be done by a licensed third
party." R60. Finally, during the plea hearing, the parties and the court
specifically discussed employing a licensed third-party contractor to do the
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-5Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

work because of the victim's continued animosity towards Defendant. R188:13.
Defendant's counsel affirmed there were "no problems with that," and a
requirement that a licensed third-party contractor conduct the work was
incorporated into the plea agreement. R188:13.
Just over a month later, Defendant wrote a pro se letter to the court, asking
to change his plea agreement to "read not guilty and dismissed," because he
believed that he had met his court-imposed obligations. R63. In the letter, he
acknowledged: "As I remember it, I was to hire a licensed contractor to do the
work." Id. He added, "This I have done, and the fence is in the exact location
that it was previously. I also was to replace a tree and this I completed also." Id.
Around this time, the victim also wrote to the court, asking for restitution,
alleging that Defendant had not followed the court's order to hire a third-party
contractor to make the repairs, asserting that defendant had continued
trespassing on her property, and expressing her frustration with the ongoing
situation. R65.
About one month later, the court held a hearing on Defendant's pro se
motion to withdraw the plea. 2 R195. Defendant's counsel acknowledged that
Defendant had replaced the fence himself, because the contractor he had "set up

2

Eventually, defendant decided not to pursue his motion to withdraw
the plea in abeyance and the court struck it. R189:3-4.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-6-

. . . bailed on him in the last minute, so [Defendant] tried to achieve it himself
and patch the fence/7 R195:2. Defendant asserted that he "did have a licensed
contractor do some of the work/' but the contractor "was slow," so Defendant
"endeavored to do it himself," with the help of "another individual." Id. at 4.
Defendant's counsel said the elm tree had not been replanted because it was
"just one of those . . . trash trees," and it had grown back on its own, as had the
shrubs. Id. at 3-4.
The victim complained that Defendant had trespassed to install the fence.3
R195:2, 5,9. She stated that Defendant had re-installed the same fence that he
had torn out, and that it was "crooked," with "loose" posts; the fence was
"cracked and crumbled and [would] not stand." R195:5. The gate could not
open "because it's overlapped with wire." Id. The victim also disputed
Defendant's claims that the elm he had cut down was a "trash tree," asserting
that it had not erown back. Id. at 5-6. The court reminded Defendant that "the
work was to be done by a licensed third-party. Those were the conditions."
R195:4. The court also stated that "there was clearly an expectation that the
replacement [of the tree and shrubs] would be done in a workman-like fashion."
R195:6.
3

Defendant claimed he installed the fence on the victim's property
without trespassing because the fence was located on an alleged easement.
R195:2,9.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law-7Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The court also forbade Defendant from entering the victim's property. Id.
at 8-9.

The court urged the parties to "try to address this privately and

informally." Id. at 10. Because of the victim's continued complaints about
Defendant's trespassing, the court issued a formal no contact order at a
February 21,2006 hearing, and warned Defendant that he could be charged with
criminal trespass if he re-entered the victim's property. R193:ll.
On July 28,2006, the State filed an affidavit in support of an order to show
cause, alleging that Defendant had violated the conditions of his plea
agreement. R108-09. As of a January 19,2007, evidentiary hearing, Defendant
still had not restored the victim's yard to an adequate condition. R197:5-ll, 1719.

Defendant ultimately replaced the fence, but even after Defendant

"reinforced" the fence it was "crooked," and remained "wobbly," having been
set in the ground without cement to secure it. R197:45; 445:12,15, 40, 44. The
gate would not close and the fence did not reach the corner of the property,
leaving a gap large enough for animals to get through on both sides. R197:10,
18-19; 445:15. The victim was never contacted by a third-party contractor about
the fence replacement, nor about replanting the $4,000 mature elm that
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Defendant had cut down or any of the grape vines he had removed.4 R109;
R197:7,10. R445:12-17. The stump of the elm tree remained in the victim's yard;
it required a "permit/license" to remove and replant because of its "proximity
to a power pole." R445:15-16; R68.
Defendant admitted that he had installed the fence himself, with the
assistance of an "electrician slash handyman." R197:47-48; Def. Ex. 5, 7.
Defendant acknowledged that the electrician was only licensed as an electrician.
R197:51. Defendant testified that he did much of the fence installation himself,
while the electrician helped in "finishing up the fence." R197:49-51. The
electrician was not there throughout the entire installation. R197:50. Defendant
"assisted with setting the post, which needed some expert assistance because I
was taking a class in construction." R197:50. Defendant acknowledged that
there "were no holes dug," but asserted that he "poured the concrete into the
post to secure the design of the engineering that [Defendant] felt was necessary
to help secure those posts/' R197:50-51. The electrician, meanwhile, "did most
of the work, as far as tvine off of the fence, and installing; the electrical rod" for
grounding. R197:50.

4

The grape vines Defendant removed eventually grew back but no longer
produced fruit. Defendant claimed that the vine had never produced fruit in the
first place because it was Virginia creeper, not a grape vine. R445:16-17; R446:52,
55.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Defendant purchased a $29.97 maple sapling to replace the 45- to 50-foot
elm tree. R197:9,54-55; State's Ex. 4. He mentioned no efforts to hire any third
party to remove the stump or plant the sapling; instead he attempted to contact
the prosecutor to let the victim know that she could "pick up the tree" or "give
[him] directions as to what to do with it." R197:54-55.
After the evidentiary hearing, the court revoked the plea in abeyance,
stating my "ruling as to the plea in abeyance goes solely to not having all work
done by a licensed third-party, period." R197:59. The court also admonished
Defendant for violating the "spirit" of the plea agreement. Id.
As of a November 6, 2009 restitution hearing, the fence remained
inadequate, with "loose" posts and a gate that did not fit. R445:15, 44. The
victim's yard still contained the stump of the mature elm tree and vines that
would not produce fruit. R445:15,17. In ordering Defendant to pay restitution,
the trial court found that the Siberian elm tree was worth $4,000, that replanting
the grape vines would cost $3,000, and that it would cost $300 to remove the tree
stump. R341, 343; 197:24-26; 445:23, 25-26, 34, 37-38.5 Installing a new fence
would cost an estimated $1,200, which did not include the cost to survey the
fence line and to tear down the existing fence. R342-43; R445:40-41. The court
5

An arborist testified that the tree could not be replaced by a tree of
comparable size, but could be replaced with a 15-foot tree with a diameter of 12
to 14 inches. R445:23; 28-29.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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also noted that the victim had spent $300 in obtaining estimates. R342-43;
R446:8.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in ruling that he had violated
the condition of his plea in abeyance agreement which mandated that "the work
[must be] done by a licensed third party/' He contends that this provision did
not prohibit him from doing some of the work, and that he substantially
complied with it. Moreover, he asserts that the language of the provision is
ambiguous. Aplt.Br. at 13-19.
Defendant's argument borders on the frivolous.
unambiguous on its face.

The language is

In context, considering the ongoing animosity

between the parties, the import of the order is unmistakable. Any reasonable
person would know that a licensed third party was to do all of the work.
Indeed, Defendant demonstrated his actual knowledge that he knew he was not
to do the work in a letter he wrote to the court.
Defendant also did not substantially comply or act in good faith to
accomplish the terms of the plea in abeyance agreement. Defendant cut down a
fifty-foot tree and fruiting grapevines and removed a fence.

The plea in

abeyance agreement directed Defendant to replace those items.
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Instead,

Defendant installed a wobbly fence, planted Virginia creeper, and bought a
thirty-dollar sapling.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
FINDING THAT DEFENDANT VIOLATED THE CONDITION
OF HIS PLEA AGREEMENT REQUIRING THAT REPAIR
WORK BE DONE BY A THIRD-PARTY LICENSED
CONTRACTOR
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by ruling that he had violated
the conditions of his plea agreement and asks this Court to reinstate his plea in
abeyance. Aplt.Br, at 19. Defendant argues that he substantially and in good
faith complied with the plea agreement by replacing the fence himself, with the
assistance of an electrician and by purchasing a $30 maple sapling to replace the
victim's $4,000 mature elm tree. Aplt.Br. at 14-18. He further asserts that the
requirement for the work to be done by a third-party licensed contractor is
ambiguous. Aplt. Br. at 9-13,16-17.
Defendant's arguments border on the frivolous. See Utah R. App. P. 33(b)
("[A] frivolous appeal... is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by
existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or
reverse existing law/'). In order to succeed in his claim, Defendant "must show
that the evidence of a [plea agreement] violation, viewed in a light most favorable to
the trial court's findings, is so deficient that the trial court abused its discretion in
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revoking" it. State v. Martinez, 811 P.2d 205,208 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting State
v. Jameson, 800 P.2d 798 (Utah 1990)) (brackets added; emphasis in original).
Defendant has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion. The
language directing Defendant to engage a third party to do the work was not
ambiguous. Indeed, in context, its import was unmistakable. Moreover, the
condition was reiterated multiple times on the record. R51-58,60; 188:13. Given
the facts of this case, any reasonable person would know what constituted
compliance with this condition of the agreement. In any event, Defendant
demonstrated his actual knowledge of the condition at issue here when he wrote
to the court and specifically acknowledged not only his responsibility to hire a
third-party contractor to do the ordered work but also falsely represented that a
third-party contractor did do the work. See R63.
In terminating defendant's plea in abeyance, the court found:
I think [defendant] frankly acknowledged, at least in my mind,
the work was not done as ordered by a third-party. . . .

And last, though, is the third-party agreement, that it be done by
a licensed third-party. You know, one of the reasons was — that
is, so we wouldn't have this exact kind of issue. The fact is, color
it however you want, he was out there with a third-party doing
the work, and was not supervised by the third-party at all times.
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[Tjhe order is all work being done by a third-party and you tell
me he's just assisting, and somebody is looking over his
shoulder. It's not being done by him [i.e. the third party]. And,
frankly, he's [i.e. Defendant's] admitted that he wasn't
supervised at all times by the third-party.
R197:55-57 (Ruling attached at Addendum B).
The key to understanding why the court did not abuse its discretion when
it determined that defendant violated the condition of his plea agreement lies in
its observation that "one of the reasons [for mandating the work be done by a
third party] was - - that is, so we wouldn't have this exact kind of issue." Id. at
56. The court uttered these words in January of 2007. "This exact kind of issue"
refers to the continuation of the incendiary relationship between the victim and
Defendant, who had been at odds since February of 2004.6 By that time, without
permission or authority, Defendant had torn down a chain link fence on the
victim's property, as well as the grape vines that covered the fence. R4,197:5-6.
The victim lost both the privacy and security she had previously enjoyed in her
back yard. R65. Less than three months later, defendant returned and cut down
a mature elm tree on her property, leaving a five-foot-tall stump. R4; 197:7;
445:15-16. Defendant was ordered "to have no contact with the victim" at his
initial appearance. R9.

6

In a letter to the district court, the victim rhetorically asked, "Is there
pain and suffering? Well, he is the biggest pain I have suffered in my adult
years." R. 65.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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By the time Defendant entered his plea, nearly a year and a half had
passed since the victim had been left without a fence, grape vines, or a mature
tree in her back yard. R51. She was still upset and agitated over Defendant's
interference with her property. R188:13. Accordingly, during the plea hearing,
the parties and the court specifically discussed employing a licensed third-party
contractor to do the work to avoid any further confrontation between the
parties:
State: We're asking, Your Honor, that this repair be done by a
licensed third party because there is still some animosity
with [Defendant] personally being there [on the victim's
property].
The Court: Is that a term and condition [of the plea]?
Defense Counsel: We have no problems with that.
The Court: All right. We'll incorporate that, then, into the terms
of the plea in abeyance.
R188:13.
On October I, 2005, Defendant sent a letter to the court stating that he
understood he "could change the plea in the time period identified and put back
the fence and tree that my neighbor claimed I damaged

As I remember it, I

was to hire a licensed contractor to do the work This I have done." R63 (emphasis
added).
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About two months later and just under two years since her ordeal began,
the victim wrote to the court in frustration, alleging that Defendant had
continued to trespass on her property and that he had not hired a third-party
contractor to fix the damages. R65. She wrote, "I have been as patient as my
personality allows, but the limit has been reached." Id.
At two subsequent hearings before the hearing on the order to show
cause, the court clearly reiterated the condition that Defendant now claims was
ambiguous. See R188:13; 195:4. On January 13, 2006, after Defendant had
inadequately repaired the fence himself and the victim had complained that he
had violated the court's order, the court reiterated, "The tree was going to be
replaced, the shrubs were going to be replaced that had been destroyed and the
work was to be done by a licensed third-party. Those were the conditions/ 7
R195:4.
At no time did the trial court indicate that Defendant could have any part
in the process nor did the contentious circumstances of the case give rise to any
reasonable inference that he could be involved in anv wav. Indeed, the victim's
animosity towards Defendant was palpable. See id. at 3,5,8-9. On February 21,
2006, the court again recited the conditions of probation, concluding that "all of
that work was to be done by a licensed third-party contractor." R193:2. The
hearing concluded with a long discussion of the court's no contact order, which
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plainly reflected the victim's ongoing agitation and anger over Defendant's
continued intrusions onto her property. Id. at 7-10.
In this case, the plain meaning of "licensed third party" excludes
Defendant from participating in any of the work. Defendant is not a third party
and he has presented no evidence to suggest that he is licensed to perform any
of- the construction duties required by the plea agreement. Even if the term
"licensed third party" were ambiguous on its face, the circumstances
surrounding the plea agreement make its meaning unmistakable. The language
requiring a licensed third party was inserted into the agreement specifically
because the victim requested that Defendant stay off her property and not do
any of the work. R55, 60; R188:13. From the time of Defendant's initial
appearance it was clear that he was to have "no contact" with the victim. R9.
Defendant even acknowledged that he understood he "was to hire a licensed
contractor to do the work." R63. The court reminded Defendant of this
condition at more than one hearing. R195:4; 193:7-11.
Moreover, any reasonable person in Defendant's position would have
understood that, beyond hiring a third-party licensed professional, Defendant
was not to have any part in completing the repair work.

Under these

circumstances, Defendant's claim borders on the frivolous. He has asserted no
legal or credible factual basis on which to claim that the court granted him
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authority to participate in any way in the ordered repair work. Indeed, within a
month of the court's order, when defendant wrote to the court asking to change
his plea, he stated: "As I remember it, I was to hire a licensed contractor to do
the work/'

R63. Thus, in addition to the court's clear order, defendant

conceded that he had actual knowledge that he was not to do the work.

Finally, no citation to authority is required to show that Defendant neither
substantially complied nor acted in good faith to fulfill the conditions of the plea
in abeyance agreement. As stated, the plain terms of the plea agreement made it
clear that Defendant was to hire a licensed third party to replace the fence, and
replant the elm tree and grape vines that he had torn from the victim's yard.
Defendant was informed of this condition and agreed to it. R 55; R188:4,13. He
told the court he understood the condition. R63. However, Defendant chose not
to comply with his plea agreement. Instead, Defendant did much of the work
on the fence himself, installing a "wobbly" fence that had gaps big enough for
animals to get through. R197:10, 18-19; R445:15, 40, 44. He was aided by a
licensed electrician, who was apparently neither licensed nor competent to
install fences.

R197:51; 445:40, 44. Instead of removing the stump and

replanting a mature elm, Defendant purchased what he thought was a maple
sapling and did nothing with it. R197:9, 54-55. Indeed, while the court ruled
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that Defendant did not 'Violate the letter'' of the plea condition by replacing a
50-foot tree with a sapling, it also asserted that he had "absolutely violated the
spirit of the agreement." R197:56, 58-59. Defendant also did not replace the
California grape vines he had torn out, but instead planted a "nuisance"
shrub — Virgina Creeper. R197:17; 341; 446:38-39. This was all in direct violation
of his own understanding that he was to "hire a licensed contractor to do the
work." R63.
In this case, Defendant was charged with two counts of criminal mischief,
second and third degree felonies, respectively. He pleaded no contest to a
reduced class A misdemeanor. This plea was held in abeyance on condition that
Defendant repair the damage he had done to the victim's yard, by hiring a
licensed third party to replant an elm tree and shrubbery and rebuild the fence
he had torn down. R55. He now asks this Court to ignore that he breached the
plea agreement by violating the plain term that a "licensed third party" was to
do the work. He does so by asking this court to find either that the agreement
was so vague that he could not understand what it required of him, or
alternatively, that he substantially complied with its terms. Aplt. Br. at 9-18.
Both claims fail.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted the £&_ day of October, 2011.
MARKL.SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General

KENNETH A. BRONSTON

Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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U.C.A. 1953 § 77-2a-l
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure
"iChapter 2A. Pleas in Abeyance fRefs & Annos)
••§ 77-2a-l. Definitions
For the purposes of this chapter:
(1) "Plea in abeyance" means an order by a court, upon motion of the prosecution and the
defendant, accepting a plea of guilty or of no contest from the defendant but not, at that time,
entering judgment of conviction against him nor imposing sentence upon him on condition that
he comply with specific conditions as set forth in a plea in abeyance agreement.
(2) "Plea in abeyance agreement" means an agreement entered into between the prosecution
and the defendant setting forth the specific terms and conditions upon which, following
acceptance of the agreement by the court, a plea may be held in abeyance.
Laws 1993, c. 82, § 3.

U.C.A. 1953 § 77-2a-2
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure
"HChapter 2A. Pleas in Abeyance fRefs & Annos)
•*§ 77-2a-2. Plea in abeyance agreement—Negotiation—Contents—Terms of
agreement—Waiver of time for sentencing
(1) At any time after acceptance of a plea of guilty or no contest but prior to entry of judgment
of conviction and Imposition of sentence, the court may, upon motion of both the prosecuting
attorney and the defendant, hold the plea in abeyance and not enter judgment of conviction
against the defendant nor impose sentence upon the defendant within the time periods contained
In Rule 22(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
(2) The defendant shall be represented by counsel during negotiations for a plea in abeyance and
at the time of acknowledgment and affirmation of any plea in abeyance agreement unless the
defendant shall have knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel.
(3) The defendant has the right to be represented by counsel at any court hearing relating to a
plea in abeyance agreement.
(4)(a) Any plea in abeyance agreement entered into between the prosecution and the defendant
and approved by the court shall include a full, detailed recitation of the requirements and
conditions agreed to by the defendant and the reason for requesting the court to hold the plea in
abeyance.
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i

(b) If the plea is to a felony or any combination of misdemeanors and felonies, the agreement
shall be in writing and shall, prior to acceptance by the court, be executed by the prosecuting
attorney, the defendant, and the defendant's counsel in the presence of the court.
<
(5) A plea shall not be held in abeyance for a period longer than 18 months if the plea was to
any class of misdemeanor or longer than three years If the plea was to any degree of felony or to
any combination of misdemeanors and felonies.
I

(6) A plea in abeyance agreement shall not be approved unless the defendant, before the court,
and any written agreement, knowingly and intelligently waives time for sentencing as designated
in Rule 22(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
r

•

CREDIT(S)
Laws 1993, c. 82, S 4.

U.C.A. 1953 § 77-2a-4
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure
liChapter 2A. Pleas in Abeyance fRefs & Annos)
"•§ 77-2a-4. Violation of plea in abeyance agreement—Hearing—Entry of judgment and
imposition of sentence—Subsequent prosecutions
(1) If, at any time during the term of the plea in abeyance agreement, information comes to the
attention of the prosecuting attorney or the court that the defendant has violated any condition
of the agreement, the court, at the request of the prosecuting attorney, made by appropriate
motion and affidavit, or upon its own motion, may issue an order requiring the defendant to
appear before the court at a designated time and place to show cause why the court should not
find the terms of the agreement to have been violated and why the agreement should not be
terminated. If, following an evidentiary hearing, the court finds that the defendant has failed to
substantially comply with any term or condition of the piea in abeyance agreement, it may
terminate the agreement and enter judgment of conviction and impose sentence against the
defendant for the offense to which the original plea was entered. Upon entry of judgment of
conviction and imposition of sentence, any amounts paid by the defendant as a piea in abeyance
fee prior to termination of the agreement shall be credited against any fine imposed by the court.
(2) The termination of a plea in abeyance agreement and subsequent entry of judgment of
conviction and imposition of sentence shall not bar any independent prosecution arising from any
offense that constituted a violation of any term or condition of an agreement whereby the
original plea was placed in abeyance.

Laws 1993, c. 82, 5 6.
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was not done as ordered by a third-party.
At least what I've heard —
you address it if you want.

and IT11 let

One, I don!t hear

anything to suggest he's violated the no contact
order.
that.

Two, the shrubbery, no real basis for finding
Three, the tree, frankly, the order is

ambiguous.

If it wasn't ambiguous, you wouldnTt be

offering that sapling as a replacement, thatTs

—

certainly doesn't violate the letter; you' ve
absolutely violated the spirit of the agreement.

And

last, though, is the third-party agreement, that it be
done by a licensed third-party.
reasons was —
kind of issue.

You know, one of the

that is, so we wouldn't have this exact
The fact is, color it however you

want, he was out there with a third-party doing the
work, and not supervised by the third-party at all
times.
MR. KURUMSJDA:
offer, Your Honor, is:

The only argument I?d

The work is supposed to be

done by a third-party, but it's not —
THE COURT:

All work.

MR. KURUM&DA:

ItTs not —

it doesn't

prohibit him from assisting a third party.

And that's

what he's doing, he's trying to assist labor to cover
the costs.
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1

THE COURT:

You can sit down.

2

MR. KURUMADA:

3

THE COURT:

That's --'

Well, then all work isn!t

4

being done by a third-party.

I mean, the order is all

5

work being done by a third-party, and you tell me he' s

6

just assisting, and somebody is looking over his

7

shoulder.

8

he's admitted that he wasn't supervised at all times

9

by the third-party.

It's not being done by him.

And, frankly,

10

You can step down, Mr. Martin.

11

THE WITNESS:

12

MR. KURUMADA:

13

MR. BURMESTER:

14

All right.
We'd rest.
We'd submit it,

Your Honor.

15

THE COURT:

16

All right.

I'm revoking the

plea in abeyance.

17

MR. BURMESTER:

Your Honor, we would ask

18 I that we do a PSR, and that way we can determine a
19

value of the restitution, and then we can just talk

20 J about money instead of different people putting things
21

in question.

22

THE COURT:

23

record:

24

affidavit.

25

I'll make it clear for the

There are four allegations, I believe, in the

MR. BURMESTER:

I

Your Honor, I think the

__
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1

one is just an assertion that the Court made some

2

orders, so it would really be three allegations of

3

violation:

4

Two, 3 and 4.
THE COURT:

Mr. Kurumada, if you think I'm

5

wrong, this is your chance to argue, but I'm letting

6

you know what ITm thinking.

7

Let me put it differently:

I know you

8

think I'm wrong, this is still your chance to convince

9

me, but that's

10

—

MR. KURUMADA:

11

Well, all I would say,

Judge, is that I think Mr. Martin did the best he

12 I could in terms of respecting the Court's order.

He

13

did have someone who did the majority of the work with

14

respect to the fence.

15

as good as Ms. Randazzo wanted, but she also wanted

16

and eight-foot vinyl fence, too, and that was totally

17

not in the spirit of the plea negotiation or the plea

It wasn't as —

it wasn't maybe

18 I in abeyance,
19 I

THE COURT:

Clearly not.

20 I

MR. KURUMADA:

And, you know, he was

21 I supposed furnish a tree.
22

You are not going to be able

to go out and find a 50-foot elm tree.

23

THE COURT:

You can find replacement

24

trees.

25

you chop down mature trees.

I

It's expensive, but that's what happens when

_
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Now, I understand that we didnft talk

1
2

about it, and I donTt know if I would have ordered,

3

you know, a 50-foot elm tree or —

4

wouldn't have been a sapling.

5

something that has about a -- you know, two-inch

6

diameter either.

7

MR. KURUMADA:

8

THE COURT:

9

what I do know, it

It wouldn!t have been

Uh-huh.

Be that as it may, I'm not

revoking on that because of the ambiguity.

10

MR. KURUMADA:

11 I

THE COURT:

That's fine —

I'm just indicating for

12 purposes of my ruling, I do believe it's ambiguous.
13

do believe that Mr. Martin at least violated the

14

spirit of that, but because of its ambiguity, in no

15

way, shape or —

16

that he violated the plea in abeyance as a result.

17

no way, shape or form --in ruling

My ruling as to the plea in abeyance goes

18

solely to not having all work done by a licensed

19

third-party, period.

20

MR. KURUMADA:.. Okay.

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. KURUMADA:

23

I understand.

That's the sole basis.
Do you want to set — do.

you want a PSR?

24
25

I

THE COURT:

Do I need a Presentence Report

for this?
59
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

